In tro duc tion
Unem ploy ment is al ways a pres sing mat ter for go vern ments all around the world. Sin ce 2008 when the glo bal eco no mic cri sis be gan it has be co me even more pres sing. To fight high unem ploy ment ra tes and ci ti zen dis sa tis fac tion go vern ments im ple men ted va ri ous po li cies to re du ce unem ploy ment or at least to keep it un der con trol.
The most of ten used go vern ment tac tic to re du ce unemploy ment and in crea se em ploy ment are go vern ment sub si dies which enab le com pa nies to em ploy un der dif fe rent cir cumstan ces than tho se that the la bor mar ket al lows by it self. Sub sidies also give pri va te ci ti zens the pos si bi lity for en tre pre neurship sti mu lus pac ka ges which also re du ces unem ploy ment.
We will ex plo re how go vern ment's sub si di zing and country's GDP af fect unem ploy ment in a coun try. Sub si di zing is a well known mea su re to re du ce unem ploy ment so we be lie ve that it has an ef fect and on the ot her hand we be lie ve that the unem ploy ment is also af fec ted by the coun try's GDP. Also, we want to find out how unem ploy ment is af fec ted by the two se lec ted va riab les and which va riab le has a stron ger af fect. Our re search will be con duc ted on the case of Slo ve nia.
Theo re ti cal Back grounds

Unem ploy ment
Unem ploy ment is de fi ned in the re so lu tion re la ting to sta ti stics of the eco no mi cally ac ti ve po pu la tion, em ploy ment, unemploy ment and un de rem ploy ment, which was adop ted by the Thir teenth In ter na tio nal Con fe ren ce of La bour Sta ti sti cians that took pla ce in Ge ne va in 1982. As the »unem plo yed« are de fi ned all per sons abo ve a spe ci fied age who are du ring the re fe ren ce pe riod: »wit hout work«, i.e. are not in paid em ployment or self-em ploy ment as de fi ned in pa ra graph; »cur rently avai lab le for work«, i.e. are avai lab le for paid em ploy ment or self-em ploy ment du ring the re fe ren ce pe riod; and »see-king work«, i.e. have ta ken spe ci fic steps in a spe ci fied re cent pe riod to seek paid em ploy ment or self-em ploy ment (LABORSTA In ter net: Main sta ti stics (an nual) -Unem ployment (E), 27.03.2010). The pre va len ce of unem ploy ment is mea su red using the unem ploy ment rate. The unem ploy ment rate is de fi ned as the per cen ta ge of tho se in the la bor for ce who are unem plo yed (Blanc hard, 2005) .
Eco no mists di stin guish dif fe rent types of unem ploy ment: cycli cal unem ploy ment, fric tio nal unem ploy ment, struc tu ral unem ploy ment and clas si cal unem ploy ment. Oc ca sio nally are men tio ned also sea so nal unem ploy ment, hard co re unem ployment, and hid den unem ploy ment. Real-world unem ploy ment is usually the com bi na tion of dif fe rent types (Sul li van & Sheffrin, 2003) .
The re is a con stant de ba te on how to sol ve the per si stent unem ploy ment prob lem. One of the prob lems is that the ex tent and ti ming of the shift va ries across coun tries and tho se countries lag ging be hind in this pro cess of re struc tu ring ex pe rien ce lo wer growth le vels and this has con se quen ces for the le vel of unem ploy ment in dif fe rent coun tries (Thu rik, 2003) . Ag hion and Ho witt (1994) ar gue that unem ploy ment is af fec ted by doi: 10.2478/v10051-011-0003-z eco no mic growth, both, di rectly through the job-de struc tion rate, and in di rectly, through its ef fects on the in cen ti ve for firms to crea te job ope nings and hen ce on the job-fin ding rate.
Many aut hors claim that en tre pre neurs hip re du ces unemploy ment. Fa ria, Cue stas and Gil-Ala na (2009) ar gue that when unem ploy ment is high, more peo ple crea te new bu si nesses and suc cess ful new star tups crea te new jobs which lead to a re duc tion in unem ploy ment. Mo reo ver, the unem ploy ment rate can on one hand sti mu la te the start-up ac ti vity of self em ployment, but a hig her rate of self-em ploy ment may on the ot her hand in di ca te in crea sed en tre pre neu rial ac ti vity, which in the sub se quent pe riod of time re du ces the unem ploy ment. The se two ef fects have re sul ted in con si de rab le am bi gui ties about the in ter re la tions hip bet ween unem ploy ment and en tre pre neu rial ac ti vity (Au dretsch et al., 2005) . The res pon se to unem ployment or lack of out si de al ter na ti ves in the la bor mar ket can be the in di vi dual's de ci sion to start a new bu si ness (Cow ling & Bygra ve, 2002) .
GDP
Gross do me stic pro duct (GDP) has an im por tant role in eco nomics, pub lic po licy, po li tics and so ciety. Com bi ning all theories about GDP inf luen ce lead to ove rall conc lu sion that GDP is not only an ina de qua te proxy of so cial wel fa re but also has a con si de rab le im pact on pub lic and pri va te eco no mic de ci sions (Van der Bergh, 2008) . Guest and Mc Do nald (2007) point out that the sha re in glo bal GDP of a re gion is of in te rest be cau se it in di ca tes, to some ex tent, the eco no mic, po li ti cal and cul tu ral im por tan ce of that re gion. GDP is an in di ca tor of so cial wel fare and pro gress; it wit nes ses the com mon sub sti tu ting phra se »stan dard of li ving« (Van der Bergh, 2008) .
The real GDP per ca pi ta (cor rec ted for inflation) is ge nerally used as the core in di ca tor in jud ging the po si tion of the eco nomy of a coun try over time or re la ti ve to that of ot her coun tries (Van der Bergh, 2008) . It is im por tant to di stin guish bet ween real GDP on one hand and real do me stic in co me on the ot her. Real GDP is of ten used as a proxy of a coun try's real in co me and fo cu ses on pro duc tion pos si bi li ties, whe reas real in co me stres ses con sump tion pos si bi li ties and wel fa re (Koh li, 2004) .
Re searc hers of ten em ploy some form of a ge ne ra lized au to re gres si ve con di tio nal he te ro ske da sti city (GARCH) mo de ling stra tegy to exa mi ne the vo la ti lity of real GDP growth. Most such stu dies as su me a stab le GARCH or ex ponen tial GARCH (EGARCH) pro cess cap tu ring the mo ve ment in in sta bi lity (Fang & Mil ler, 2009 ). Sato (2001) stres ses the im por tan ce in ma croe co no mic con tents of po ten tial out put and the GDP gap. In his re search he de mon stra tes that GDP gap es ti ma te ma kes much bet ter eco no mic sen se in com pa ri son with ot her im por tant ma croe co no mic in di ca tors.
GDP in each coun try is de ter mi ned by a coun try's speci fic pro duc tion func tion that in cor po ra tes the usual three ar gu ments: em ploy ment, ca pi tal and to tal fac tor pro duc ti vity (Guest & Mc Do nald, 2007) . GDP per ca pi ta is of ten construed as in for ma tion about pro duc ti vity. But it is im por tant to note that a cor rect pro duc ti vity mea su re ment needs to be re la ted to the num ber of hours wor ked, which shows many va ria tions bet ween coun tries, as well as over time. GDP per hour is the re fo re a more use ful in di ca tor of pro duc ti vity than GDP per ca pi ta (Van der Bergh, 2009) . One of the rea sons why many eco no mists are in te re sted in GDP fi gu res is also be cause an in crea se in real GDP is usually as so cia ted with a rise in em ploy ment (Koh li, 2004 ).
The re la tions hip bet ween unem ploy ment and the GDP
In eco no mics, the re are a few well-known stab le em pi rical re la tions hips among ma croe co no mic va riab les. In this subc hap ter, we talk about two such re la tions hips; one is the Okun's Law and the ot her is Tay lor Rule. In sum mary, Okun's Law and the Tay lor Rule re pre sent re la tions hips among key ma croe co no mic po licy va riab les that ap pear in most text books (Mitc hell & Pear ce, 2009). Mitc hell and Pear ce (2009) ar gue that Art hur Okun was the first to note a stab le, ne ga ti ve re la tions hip bet ween unemploy ment and real out put in a po licy-orien ted ar tic le ai med at cla rif ying the costs of unem ploy ment. The sta bi lity of the re la tions hip to get her with its sim pli city may in their opi nion ex plain the po pu la rity of Okun's Law among po licy-ma kers, as well as its inc lu sion in ma croe co no mics text books. Okun (1970) sug ge sted that a one-per cen ta ge point chan ge in the unem ploy ment rate is as so cia ted with an ap pro xi ma tely threeper cen ta ge chan ge in out put in the op po si te di rec tion. This rule of thumb is re gar ded as a bench mark for po licy ma kers to mea su re the cost of hig her unem ploy ment. Re cent eco no mic de ve lop ments, ho we ver, have rai sed chal len ges to the three-toone ra tio as an em pi ri cal re gu la rity (Lee, 2000) .
John Tay lor (1993) more re cently pro po sed a sim ple rule to gui de the Fe de ral Re ser ve in set ting its no mi nal fe de ralfunds-rate tar get, the reby joi ning the long-stan ding de ba te on whet her ru les-ba sed or dis cre tio nary mo ne tary po licy bet ter ac hie ves price sta bi lity con si stent with high em ploy ment. Like Okun's Law, the Tay lor Rule quickly came to pro mi nen ce among po licy ma kers and aca de mic eco no mists ali ke.
When con si de ring the re la tions hip bet ween unem ployment and the GDP, it is also im por tant to un der stand the im por tan ce of time lags bet ween par ti cu lar eco no mic phe nome na. First, GDP dec li nes, fol lo wed by ad just ment in em ployment (the reac tions of the com pa nies are al ways so mew hat late, com pa ring to the GDP per for man ce of the coun tries), and the sta te lag (also the Go vern ments take their time to pre pa re the po licy mea su res) being even more sig ni fi cant.
Go vern ment's sub si di zing
In ge ne ral, any po licy that re du ces pro fits rai ses the unemploy ment and vice ver sa -tho se that en han ce pro fits re du ce the unem ploy ment. The re fo re, em ploy ment sub si dies should re du ce unem ploy ment and unem ploy ment be ne fits rai se it (Pis sa ri dies, 1985). But some re searc hers also cri ti ci ze sub sidies and ar gue that be cau se of the sub si dies some wor kers may lose their jobs. This is eit her due to chan ges in re la ti ve wa ges (sub sti tu tion ef fects) or be cau se sub si dies re du ce the mar ket sha re of some firms re la ti ve to ot hers (dis pla ce ment ef fects) (Betc her man et al., 2008) . Organizacija, Volume 44 Research papers Number 2, March-April 2011
Unem ploy ment sub si di zing systems vary wi dely among coun tries and also among dif fe rent pe riods, but they all tend to de crea se the unem ploy ment rate, par ti cu larly of vul ne rab le groups, and its ne ga ti ve inf luen ce on coun tries' wel fa re. In this chap ter we will fo cus on go vern ment sub si di zing of unemploy ment in Slo ve nia. We will also look at the ef fects of the cur rent cri sis on em ploy ment po li cies and hap pe nings in the Slo ve nian eco nomy as of mid-2009 and con si der the ac tions of the Slo ve nian go vern ment to mi ti ga te the ef fects of the cri sis.
In ge ne ral, the em ploy ment sub si dies in tend to re du ce the cost of la bor to em plo yers. They can be eit her ap plied to all em ploy ment or only to mar gi nal sub si dies. They can also be ge ne ral, in the sen se of appl ying to all wor kers and es tablish ments, or to only cer tain types of wor kers (for exam ple, low-wage, youth, long-term unem plo yed, wo men, or di sab led wor kers) or cer tain sec tors or geo grap hic areas wit hin the sta te (Betc her man et al., 2008) . Ors zag and Sno wer (2003) di stinguish two types of po licy pro po sals in re du cing unem ploy ment and wor king po verty: hi ring sub si dies and wage sub si dies. The hi ring sub si dies are tar ge ted en ti rely at the unem plo yed and are pro vi ded only for a li mi ted pe riod of time, the wage subsi dies, on the ot her hand, are gran ted to all low-wage ear ners re gard less of their em ploy ment hi story and are of li mit less du ra tion. Their analy sis in di ca tes that the re la ti ve ef fec ti veness of the two po li cies de pends on wor kers' pros pec ti ve wage growth.
In Slo ve nia, the em plo yers-em plo yees re la tions are in a lar ge ex tent res pon sib le for the adap ta bi lity of wor kers to the chan ging mar ket con di tions. The coun try's em ploy ment po licy also plays a great role in re du cing the unem ploy ment prob lem in a coun try. Coun try mea su res to pro mo te em ploy ment in Slo ve nia can be roughly di vi ded into pas si ve (unem ploy ment be ne fits), ac ti ve (ac ti ve em ploy ment po licy pro grams) and in ter ven tio nal (par tial sub si di zing of full-time em ploy ment).
Unem ploy ment be ne fits for unem ploy ment time are in tended to an yo ne who se em ploy ment re la tions hip did not end by their own fault. Com pen sa tion for the first three months is 70% and the fol lo wing months 60% of ave ra ge monthly in come re cei ved wit hin 12 months prior to unem ploy ment. The com pen sa tion paid can be no lo wer than 45.56% of the mi nimum wage and no hig her than three ti mes the amount of the lo west be ne fit thus de ter mi ned. Du ring the time of re cei ving mo ney com pen sa tion one is in vol ved in the com pul sory in suran ce -pen sion and di sa bi lity in su ran ce, health in su ran ce for pa rent pro tec tion and unem ploy ment be ne fits. Con tri bu tions are paid by the In sti tu te of Slo ve nia for em ploy ment (Mi ni stry of La bour, Fa mily and So cial af fairs, 2009).
The sta te as sists it mainly through the tools of ac ti ve em ploy ment po licy, whi le the size of the unem ploy ment funds is small, due to the low con tri bu tions. Ac ti ve em ployment po licy (AEP) mea su res re pre sent a ran ge of mea su res which the go vern ment ac ti vely en ga ges in the la bor mar ket and eli mi na te dis pa ri ties bet ween supply and de mand. The amount of 102.7 mio EUR was de di ca ted to this pur po se in the year 2009. The main ac tions un der the AEP are ad vi ce and job search as si stan ce, trai ning and edu ca tion, pro mo ting em ploy ment and self em ploy ment and pro grams to in crea se so cial inc lu sion (AEP 2007 (AEP -2013 . In the con text of pro mo ting em ploy ment and self-em ploy ment of unem plo yed per sons, the sta te is pro vi ding sub si dies for self-em ploy ment, an em ployment sub sidy for dif fi cultly em plo yab le per sons (e.g. young, long-term unem plo yed) and grants for reim bur se ment of la bor costs, which inc lu des reim bur se ment of the em plo yer sub sidy and part-time work (Mi ni stry of La bour, Fa mily and So cial af fairs, 2009).
Cur rently, in Slo ve nia is a spe cial emp ha sis pla ced upon the last -the sub si dies for shor te ning the wor king time and the im ple men ta tion of a so cal led "wage gua ran tee fund". In Fe bruary 2009 the go vern ment adop ted a set of mea su res that sub si di zed full-time wor king week for par ti cu lar com pa nies that have been af fec ted more than ot hers by the fall in ex port de mand and had to move to a tem po rary 36-hour or 32-hour wor king week. The to tal amount of funds avai lab le for this mea su re is 230.4 mil lion euro (ESS, 2009). The Em ploy ment Ser vi ce of Slo ve nia has un til March 2009 en te red into a contract for the par tial sub si di za tion of full-time with 207 em ployers, for 32,597 em plo yees. We ar gue that the in tro duc tion of "wage gua ran tee funds" is a bet ter tool to in crea se fle xi bi lity in the la bour mar ket, es pe cially if they would be co me a part of the wel fa re ac counts and also re sul ting in po si ti ve cor re la tion with the GDP sta bi liza tion in the be gin ning and growth furt her on. Ta ken to get her with the skill ac counts and pen sion ac counts, unem ploy ment ac counts could be a good way to re form the pre sent wel fa re sta te in Slo ve nia. The wel fa re sta te would both emp ha si ze a grea ter in di vi dual res pon si bi lity and ex po se some mec ha nisms that have thus far not pla yed an im por tant role (e.g. su stai nab le le vel of ine qua lity and the pre ser va tion of the en vi ron ment).
Met ho do logy
The sco pe of our study is to de ter mi ne how the gross do mestic pro duct and the go vern ment's sub si di zing on a coun try's le vel af fect the num ber of unem plo yed on a coun try le vel. The re search que stions of our re search are as fol lows:
R1: Howisthenum berofunem plo yedaf fec tedbytheGDP (grossdo me sticpro duct)? R2: How is the num ber of unem plo yed af fec ted by the go vern ment'ssub si di zingonacoun try'sle vel?
The va riab les used in our re search are the fol lo wing: (1) the to tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia, (2) the Slo ve nia's GDP, and (3) the num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia.
As a ba sis for the em pi ri cal part of our re search, we've gat he red the data on to tal sub si dies, GDP and the num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia for the years 1999 to 2008. This data are pre sen ted in the tab le 1.
Re sults and dis cus sion
Re sults
We be gan our analy sis by con struc ting the fre quency tab le (Tab le 2) and the cor re la tion ma trix (Tab le 3) for the va riab les used in our re search.
From Tab le 3 we can see that »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« and »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« have a po si ti ve and high Pear son r Cor re la tion Coef fi cient which is sta ti sti cally sig ni fi cant. On the ot her hand the Pear son r Corre la tion Coef fi cient bet ween »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)« and »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« is also high and sta tisti cally sig ni fi cant but the cor re la tion is ne ga ti ve. The aut hors had an idea to es ti ma te the two re gres sions to get her in or der to find the par tial ef fects of both va riab les on unem ploy ment. Ho we ver, be cau se we wan ted to avoid the ef fect of au to corre la tion bet ween »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« and »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)«, we con duc ted the two se pa ra te re gres sion analy ses of their af fects on the »Num ber of unemplo yed in Slo ve nia«. In Tab le 4 we used the re gres sion to analy ze the re lations hip bet ween the in de pen dent va riab le re pre sen ting »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« and the de pen dent va riab le »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia«.
With the pre dic tor »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« that we have used in our re gres sion analy sis, 50.6% va rian ce of »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« is ex plained. »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« have a po si ti ve ef fect on »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« (β=0.749 and is sta ti sti cally sig ni fi cant at the 0.013 le vel).
In Tab le 5 we used the re gres sion to analy ze the re la tionship bet ween the in de pen dent va riab le re pre sen ting »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)« and the de pen dent va riab le »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia«.
With the pre dic tor »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)« that we have used in our re gres sion analy sis, 95.2% va rian ce of »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« is ex plai ned. »Slo venia's GDP (in mio €)« has a ne ga ti ve ef fect on »Num ber of 
Dis cus sion
Our re search shows us that ba sed on the data of the va riab les that we cho se to con duct our re search on, we can ans wer our two re search que stions. Ba sed on the Pear son r Cor re la tion Coef fi cients (Tab le 3) we can conc lu de that when the »Num-ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« in crea ses the »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« also in crea se. On the ot her hand, we can see that when »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)« in crea ses the »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« drops. We can also conc lu de ba sed on the Pear son r Cor re la tion Coef fi cients that the cor re la tion is hig her when it co mes to »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)« than it is in »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)«. Our first re search que stion (R1) was about how the number of unem plo yed is af fec ted by the GDP (gross do me stic pro duct), which we have ans we red using re gres sion analysis (Tab le 4). »To tal sub si dies in Slo ve nia (in mio €)« have a po si ti ve ef fect on »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« (fl=0.749 and is sta ti sti cally sig ni fi cant at the 0.013 le vel). We were sur pri sed with this re sult, be cau se ba sed simply on this we can conc lu de that sub si dies ac tually in crea se the num ber of unem plo yed.
The se cond re search que stion (R2) was how the num ber of unem plo yed is af fec ted by the go vern ment's sub si di zing on a coun try's le vel, which we have ans we red using re gres sion analy sis (Tab le 5). »Slo ve nia's GDP (in mio €)« has a ne ga ti ve ef fect on »Num ber of unem plo yed in Slo ve nia« (fl=-0.978 and is sta ti sti cally sig ni fi cant at the 0.000 le vel). Such an ans wer -that hig her GDP re du ces the num ber of unem plo yed -was ex pec ted.
The li mi ta tions of the re search are de fi ni tely the small amount of the ob ser va tions, which might cau se that rea ders might think that the re sults are not re liab le. Ho we ver, the avai la bi lity of data was cer tainly a re stric ting fac tor in our re search, sin ce the Mi ni stry of Fi nan ce holds data on the sub si dies only from year 1999 on wards. Should the aut hors be able to gat her more ob ser va tions, a coin te gra tion analy sis would be used wit hin our re search.
Conc lu sion
Unem ploy ment is a prob lem that has to be sol ved. It is the prob lem that af fects ci ti zens of all coun tries in the world and re pre sents a con cern for all the go vern ments. One of the most of ten used tac tics to pre vent unem ploy ment, or to lo wer it, is go vern ment's sub si di zing. Sub si dies should enab le peo ple to re tain or gain em ploy ment which would by it self not be possib le wit hout the se sub si dies.
Through our re search we have found that sub si di zing is not the right way to pre vent unem ploy ment. It is just a ban da ge to con trol it for short pe riods of time, per haps to lo wer the dissa tis fac tion of the ci ti zens and to pose an ima ge that so meo ne is doing so met hing to lo wer unem ploy ment and to help tho se who are or are to be unem plo yed.
The re duc tion of the unem ploy ment can be ac hie ved through the eco no mic growth. Ba sed on our re search, we have conc lu ded that the in crea se of coun try's GDP lo wers the num ber of unem plo yed sig ni fi cantly. Coun tries with the prob lem of high unem ploy ment should the re fo re fo cus on the de ve lop ment. As a conc lu ding re mark, we want to emp ha si ze that the em ploy ment by it self is not enough, but the em plo yees should rat her aim at pro du cing high va lue ad ded which will furt her in crea se the coun try's GDP and lo wer the num ber of unem plo yed. De pen dentVa riab le:Num berofunem plo yedinSlo ve nia.
Vla do Di mov ski (1960) is a full pro fes sor of ma na ge ment and or ga ni za tion at the Fa culty of eco no mics Uni ver sity of ljub lja na. his re search in te rests are: stra te gic ma na gement, or ga ni za tio nal lear ning, com pe ti ti ve ness, de ve lo ping know led ge-ba sed or ga ni za tion, and la bor mar ket is sues. di mov ski has re cei ved his B.a. de gree in eco no mics and phi lo sophy, and m.a. in eco no mics from Uni ver sity of ljublja na, and ph.d. in ma na ge ment and Fi nan ce from Cle veland sta te Uni ver sity. he was sta te se cre tary for in du stry in the go vern ment of slo ve nia (1995) (1996) (1997) , pre si dent of the Cen ter for in ter na tio nal Com pe ti ti ve ness (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , and mi ni ster for la bor, Fa mily, and so cial af fairs (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . di mov ski has also wide ex pe rien ce in con sul ting for nu merous com pa nies, in sti tu tions, and go vern ments, par ti cu larly on the is sues of stra te gic ma na ge ment, la bor mar ket, mergers and ac qui si tions, and the eU-re la ted is sues. as an aca de mi cian di mov ski has taught and re searc hed at the va ri ous uni ver si ties and in sti tu tions, and has pub lis hed in re cog ni zed jour nals.
Miha Ma rič gra dua ted in 2006 and in the fol lo wing year (2007) re cei ved his ma ster's de gree at the Fa culty of econo mics, Uni ver sity of ljub lja na. he is cur rently em plo yed as an as si stant at the Fa culty of or ga ni za tio nal scien ces Univer sity of ma ri bor and is a doc to ral stu dent at the Fa culty of eco no mics, Uni ver sity of ljub lja na.
Ja smi na Žni dar šič gra dua ted in mar ke ting and mar ke ting com mu ni ca tions at the Fa culty of so cial scien ces in 2005 and in 2007 re cei ved her ma ster's de gree in in ter na tio nal re la tions at lon don me tro po li tan Uni ver sity, lon don. Currently she is em plo yed as an as si stant at the Fa culty of or ga ni za tio nal scien ces Uni ver sity of ma ri bor and this year will be gin doc to ral stu dies at the Fa culty of or ga ni za tio nal scien ces Uni ver sity of ma ri bor.
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